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Abstract
We study the incentive that governments have to protect IPR in a
trading world economy, focusing on the patent novelty requirement and its
e⁄ect on growth and trade. We consider a world economy with ongoing
innovation in two regions. The North is assumed to have a higher wage
than the South and a greater capacity for innovation, the South is assumed
to have a larger population than the North. We introduce heterogeneity
in innovation size together with the obligation, imposed by Patent O¢ ce
inside each region, that innovation size must be higher than the patent
novelty requirement. This patent characteristic stands to be a useable in-
strument to promote innovation and growth, and also a strategic trade
policy instrument. We numerically determine the Nash equilibrium of the
strategic game that results of the patent novelty requirement setting by
each regional authority. We then compare, in terms of welfare, the non-
cooperative equilibrium with the equilibrium that results from the patent
novelty requirement harmonization, when the level of this common patent
novelty requirement is set by a supra-regional organization.
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1Introduction
Since the agreement on Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property rights
(the TRIPs Agreement) has been rati￿ed in 1994, stipulating that all members
of the World Trade Organization must adopt a set of universal minimum stan-
dards on intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, theoretical and empirical
studies have balanced the pros and the cons of this agreement (see Maskus and
Penubarti [1995] or McCalman [2001] for example). The general point of view
is that the terms of the agreement are based on the prevailing standards in
developed countries (the North) at the time of the negotiation. Southern coun-
tries are thus forced to strengthen their IPR protection. Most of all previous
multi-sectorial North-South Trade model build to analyze IPR protection have
focused on the length of patent or straightly discussed the e⁄ect of a reduc-
tion of the rate of imitation of northern products by southern ￿rms (Helpman
[1993], Lai [1998], Kwan and Lai [2003], Lai and Qiu [2003], Grossman and Lai
[2004], Dinopoulos and al. [2005] for example). There exists a consensus around
the fact that this agreement leads to a reinforcement of IPR protection in the
southern countries and a welfare decrease for the consumers of these countries.
Following the development of the Industrial Organization literature, three
characteristics de￿ne the patent: its length (the statutory life; Nordhaus [1969]),
its breadth (the ￿eld cover by a single patent; Klemperer [1990], Gallini [1992])
and its height (the stringency of the granting process; Hunt [1999]). The patent
length and coverage are now rather ￿xed under the TRIPs agreement. The only
available IPR instruments are likely to be associated with breadth and height1.
E⁄ect of patent breadth has already been studied into a North-South model of
growth and trade framework (see Helpman [1993] and some of the studies above
mentioned focusing on the e⁄ect of lowering imitation in the south by increasing
patent breadth or length) whereas the e⁄ects of patent height on growth and
trade ￿ ows remain to be studied.
Grossman and Lai [2004] and Lai and Qiu [2003] are the closest studies to our
present one. These authors also study the incentives that national authorities
have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy. Grossman
and Lai associate the strength of IPR protection to an index that captures both
the country￿ s patent length and the stringency of its enforcement policy. They
study a patent regime with national treatment, where the same protection is
o⁄ered to all inventors irrespective of their nation of origin. They ￿nd that,
if the capacity for research and development is greater in the North than in
the South and the market for innovative products is at least as large there,
then patent protection will be stronger in the North than in the South in a
Nash equilibrium. Deriving the properties of an e¢ cient global regime of IPR,
that is a regime that is incentive for both countries, they ￿nd that there is
various combination of patent policies in the two countries providing optimal
aggregate incentive for innovation. Among combinations of policies that give
the same overall incentive for global research, the North fares better, and the
South worse, the stronger is patent protection in the South. The implication
of this ￿ndings is that harmonization of patent policies is neither necessary nor
1The IPR protection harmonization that follows the TRIPs has leaden to the adoption of
a worldwide standard for the patent system but stringency of patent examination during the
granting process always presents some national or regional speci￿cities. The patent￿ s novelty
requirement preserves the capacity to be set by national or regional authorities.
2su¢ cient condition for global e¢ ciency.
Lai and Qiu [2003] compare the Nash equilibrium IPR protection standard
of the South with that of the North and ￿nd that the former is naturally weaker
than the latter (in terms of patent length). They show that both regions can
gain from an agreement requiring South to harmonize its IPR standards with
those of the North and the North to liberalize its traditional goods market.
However, both of these papers assume that lifetime of products is exoge-
nously given. Our framework explicitely incorporates the link between inno-
vation and obsolescence (the creative destruction process at the heart of the
Schumpeterian new growth theory). In this paper, the product obsolescence
rate is a function of the innovation rate, this latter being tied with the endoge-
nous R&D e⁄orts of the ￿rms.
In this paper, we thus study the incentive that governments have to pro-
tect intellectual property in a trading world economy, focusing on the patent
height or patent novelty requirement (hereafter PNR) and its e⁄ect on growth
and trade, using a schumpeterian framework that enables to take into account
the endogenous obsolescence of product (the quality ladder model of growth
following Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos [1990], Grossman and Helpman
[1991,Chap.4] and Aghion and Howitt[1992]2)
We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two regions (the
North and the South). The North is assumed to have a higher wage than the
South, a lower population size and a greater capacity for innovation. Nowadays,
we can notice an increase of innovative activities in middle or even poor-income
countries (Brazil, Korea, China) so it seems important to build a model apt
for studying the relation between trading partners with positive but di⁄erent
abilities to conduct research and development, in order to determine whether
they will set di⁄erent level of patent height. The two regions can choose their
patents￿novelty requirements (PNRs) based on welfare considerations.
The consequences of PNR setting either on the innovation frequency, and
thus on the rythm of the obsolescence process, and on the innovation size is
the central point of this paper. Di⁄erent PNRs settings at a regional level
implie di⁄erenciated technological regimes and di⁄erent growth rates for the
two regions. The choice of an IPR regime has then important consequences for
trade ￿ ows between the two regions.
As the model is substancially complicated to conduct an analytical investiga-
tion, we rely on numerical simulations to obtain the main ￿ndings. We consider
four scenarii : (i) the regional choice of PNRs through non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium, (ii) the supra-regional harmonization of PNRs across the North
and the South based on the Northern PNR level; "Northern-inspired harmo-
nization", (iii) the supra-regional harmonization of PNR across the North and
the South to maximize global welfare; "Global-welfare-maximizing harmoniza-
tion", and (iv) the regional choice of PNRs trough cooperative equilibrium.
Our ￿ndings can be summarized as follows.
￿ First, in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, the Northern PNR is higher
than the southern one, and the Northern di⁄erentiated goods average
quality growth rate is higher than the Southern one for plausible values
2Surveys on the more recent developments of this branch of the endogenous growth based
on innovation literature are Dinopoulos and Suener [2004] and Aghion and Howitt [2005].
3of key parameters of the model3.
￿ Second, as one moves from the ￿rst towards the fourth scenario above
described, global welfare levels increase. Global welfare attains its lowest
level with the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium and its highest level with
the cooperative equilibrium.
￿ Third, compared to the non-cooperative equilibrium, harmonization of any
form implies a increase in Southern PNR standard and a fall in Northern
PNR standard. Harmonization of any form increases the Southern welfare
whereas it decreases the Northern welfare.
￿ Fourth, harmonization of PNRs and opening up of the Northern tradi-
tional good market can be complementary. Since Global-welfare-maximizing
harmonization is associated with lowering of Northern PNR standard, it
follows that reduced Northern PNR level and free trade can be comple-
mentary, as far as Southern PNR standard increases.
The model is presented in the ￿rst section. We determine the balanced
growth equilibrium and establish the northern and southern reaction functions,
depending on the levels of PNR of both regions, in section 2. The results of
numerical simulations of the model enabling to determine the Nash equilibrium
and the harmonized patent protection equilibrium are presented in section 3.
We discuss the results of the model and possible extensions, and then conclude.
1 The model
1.1 Preliminaries
There are two traded sectors in each regions: a vertically di⁄erentiated goods
sector and a traditional good sector. Verticals innovations, that must be patented,
take place in the di⁄erentiated products sectors. An innovation corresponds
to an increase of the quality level in a di⁄erentiated good sector. Region k
government sets a threshold sk for the novelty requirement, that every patent
application must complete for being granted (that is the size of the vertically
innovation must be superior to sk). Both governments announce and immedi-
ately enforce patent novelty requirement sN and sS respectively in the North
and in the South for all goods invented. In each period, resources are allocated
to the research sector in order to improve the existing di⁄erentiated products
quality levels.
We assume that the sets of di⁄erentiated products in the North and South
are non-intersecting and that consumers in both regions consume all the di⁄er-
entiated goods. A ￿rm, localized in one of the two regions, produces a given
di⁄erentiated good for both markets (the national and the foreign one). Imita-
tion of foreign patents by national ￿rm is not taken into account.
3It would be theoretically possible for the Southern PNR level to be higher than the
Northern level in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, even if this issue do not appear for
plausible values of key parameters
4Both regions have innovative capacities which is an important di⁄erence with
the usual framework used to assess the results of worldwide patent harmoniza-
tion when the South is often assumed to have only imitation capacities (see for
example Helpman [1993], Kwan and Lai [2003]). On one hand, Maskus [2000]
provides evidence for increased patent counts and R&D intensity in southern
countries that corroborates our assumption. On the other hand, increasing
R&D in southern countries can only capture more imitative R&D and not in-
novations of next generation. Dinoupolos and Segerstrom [2006] provides a
complete North-South growth model enabling to distinguish between the two
types of R&D.
We have chosen to adopt an industry con￿guration scheme closer to the one
proposed by Lundborg and Segerstrom [2002], in which the continuum of indus-
tries is exogenously divided in two categories (high-tech and low-tech industries,
the former in the North, the latter in the South). In our framework, we make
no assumption about the technological level of industries depending on their ge-
ographical localization. The continuum of di⁄erentiated products split up into
two parts. One part of the [0;1] continuum thus corresponds to di⁄erentiated
products manufactured by northern ￿rms (z 2 [0;n]). The other part of the
continuum corresponds to goods produced by southern ￿rms (z 2 [n;1]). The
technological level in each region is much more an endogenous result based on
regional parameters rather than an exogenous and given feature of the model.
The region whose average quality level grows fastest will along time develops
high-tech products in its industries.
Such an approach with the continuum divided once for all in two enables
to focus our attention on the main issue of this paper: the IPR regime choices
depending on the regional parameters and their consequences on growth and
trade ￿ ows4.
1.2 Households
We assume that households worldwide share the same preferences. The in-






e￿￿￿d￿ with i = N;S
indicating the region (N for the North and S for the South). The instantaneous
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(2)
4Our assumption concerning a ￿xed industry con￿guration scheme is rather strong since
it implies that there is no inter-sectoral knowledge externalities and no reverse engineering
that can make evoluate the industry con￿guration scheme between the two regions along time.
Concerning externalities, Grossman and Helpman [1991, Chapter 8] also postulate the absence
of knowledge externalities between both countries in their two-countries model, even if they
point out that this assumption is rather unrealistic.
5Lets Di
t be the household consumption expenses in region i. xi
z (t) is the level
of consumption of the variety z of the continuum of di⁄erentiated goods which
quality is qi
z (t). Products of the continuum of di⁄erentiated goods are sorted
depending of the localization of their purveyor. The variable n represents the
fraction of di⁄erentiated goods produced in the North. Households also con-
sumed a traditional good in quantity Ci (t) which is tradeable in the other
region and is produced by competitive ￿rms in each region. Depending on best
available price the South would serve all the northern demand for traditional
product if there were no restriction on the northern imports, since we assume
that the North has a higher wage rate than the South5. However, we postulate
that a fraction of the traditional goods production is still manufactured in the
northern region due to protectionist policy enforced by the North (like imports
quota).
We consider that there is Li identical consumers in the region i which can
be interpreted as the market size in region i.
At each period, representative consumers maximize their instantaneous utili-










z (t) is the price of the di⁄erentiated product z developed in region i,
Di (t) is expenditure in region i and ￿ the fraction of expenditures dedicated to
di⁄erentiated goods.
The representative consumers￿instantaneous demand for di⁄erentiated prod-
uct z whose patent is in vigor, and for traditional good which is manufactured in
the region that exhibits the lowest production cost (we allow a fraction ￿ of the
traditional product being produced in the northern region, due to protectionist
policy), are respectively:
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The price of the traditional good produced in region k equals its marginal pro-
duction cost, that is the wage rate in region k.
1.3 The research sector
We describe the research process, aimed to improve the quality level of di⁄er-
entiated product in a given sector, by two steps. In the ￿rst one we establish
the qualitative increment probability distribution of a patentable innovation.
In the other step, we characterize the probability to realize a patentable inno-
vation. The innovation size probability distribution is a Pareto one, enabling
to describe the increasing di¢ culty to realize quality improvement of greater
size. The probability to realize an patentable innovation is modelled with a
Poisson process as usual. Firms undertaking a R&D program can increase their
5This feature of the model would create an impossibility to determine the steady-state
equilibrium solution and thus to solve the model. We thus have to keep a small fraction of
traditional good production in the North even if the northern wage rate is greater than the
southern one.
6probability to realize a patentable innovation (by allocating more resources to
research), but they are not able to in￿ uence the size of this innovation (the level
of the qualitative increment is drawn from a Pareto probability distribution and
thus can not be chosen or targeted). R&D uncertainty thus stands in the level
of the quality increment associated to an innovation.
1.3.1 Qualitative increment distribution and Patent Novelty require-
ment
Qualitative increments of innovations, or inventive steps, are heterogeneous,
which constitutes a re￿nement of the canonical quality ladders model, where
the qualitative increment is generally exogenous and constant6. To avoid un-
necessary complexity, we consider that the parameter of the Pareto distribution
is the same for both regions. This parameter describes the ￿eld of technological
possibility and is thus not in￿ uenced by the localization of research. All the vari-
ables that can be thought to in￿ uence the research process (the level of human
capital, the link between education and research, the e¢ ciency of the National
System of Innovation, externalities from fundamental research) will be re￿ ected
in the level of the Ai-parameter (a parameter indicating the productivity of the
research process in region i) but not in the ￿-parameter (the parameter of the
Pareto probability distribution).
The Patent O¢ ce in region i imposes a novelty requirement, by setting a
minimal threshold si for patent height. Hunt [1999] recalls that ￿To qualify
for protection (...), an invention must be novel, useful, and nonobvious. (...)
It requires that an invention represent more than a trivial advance over what
is already known￿ . Thus, a ￿rm in region i must realize an innovation whose
quality increment si
z over-passes this legal threshold in order to have a granted
patent.
si
z ￿ si with si > 1
By modelizing novelty requirement by this way, we implicitly assume that each
regional Patent O¢ ce is able during its granting process (which is instantaneous
in the model) to determine the level of each innovation￿ s qualitative step, in all
the industries of the continuum, and to compare it to the statutory requirement
si. We also consider that Patent￿ s law is perfectly enforced; there is no infringe-
ment of patent, nor by national or foreigner competitors. Probability to draw
a qualitative increment si
z lower or equal to u is given by:





= 1 ￿ u
￿ 1
￿ (5)
where ￿ is the parameter of the Pareto probability distribution (0 < ￿ < 1).
The weaker is ￿, the more di¢ cult larger quality increment are obtained (there
is more probability to obtain non-drastic innovation than to realize a drastic or
radical innovation). We can express the distribution function of quality incre-












6More precisely, Grossman and Helpman [1991,Ch.4], in a extension of their canonical
model, have examined the possibility for ￿rms to choose either the size and the frequency
of their innovation, but the innovation size keeps constant. Kortum [1997] has proposed a







￿ and the average qualitative increment of a patentable innovation in















1.3.2 Probability to obtain a patentable innovation
A ￿rm in region i that hires Li
Rz workers in industry z will succeed in generating



















￿ is the probability that the innovation is patentable given the
Pareto probability distribution and ￿
i
z (t) is the probability to realize a innova-




(6) comes from equation (5) and takes into account the probability that the
invention can be patented). The Ai-parameter indicates the e⁄ectiveness (pro-
ductivity) of the research process in region i. The Poisson arrival rate ￿
i
z (t)
is not time dependent so that we omit the time indicator (t) in the rest of the
paper.
By taking into account the novelty requirement si, we introduce a growing
di¢ culty to realize an innovation given by the legal environment (this di¢ culty
is reinforced by the complexity of the technological improvement process: the
weaker is ￿, the more di¢ cult is the probability to realize a patentable innova-
tion).
The maximization program of a ￿rm of the northern region undertaking

















is the expected innovation value. Free entry in the R&D sector leads













1.4 Di⁄erentiated products markets
The only input for production is labor. One unit of labor is required to produce
one unit of the di⁄erentiated product z, whatever its quality. An innovative
￿rm just having made an innovation with a qualitative increment si
z (superior
to the PNR in region i) has a monopoly position in industry z, given the perfect
protection ensured by the patent system. This top-quality ￿rm uses a limiting-
price strategy in order to be the only ￿rm to serve the worldwide market for this







z(t;￿￿1), where ￿ indicates the number of quality improvements that
7The maximization program for a southern ￿rm undertaking a R&D project in sector






















8have occurred in this sector until time t. The limiting-price strategy8 is thus
pi
z (t) = si
zwi (t). Quality leaders earn pro￿t ￿ ows which positively depends on
the level of their qualitative increments.
￿i







DN (t)LN + DS (t)LS￿
(8)
We are now able to de￿ne the northern balance exchange for di⁄erentiated
products BN
Z (t), the northern balance exchange for traditional good BN
C (t)
which is always negative, and global balance exchange BN (t) which is the sum
of these two northern balances:
BN
Z (t) = ￿
￿
nDS (t)LS ￿ (1 ￿ n)DN (t)LN￿
BN
C (t) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)DN (t)LN
￿wN (t) + (1 ￿ ￿)wS (t)
wS (t)
BN (t) = BN
Z (t) + BN
C (t)
1.5 Innovation value





, is the expectation of discounted pro￿ts
that ensue from the implementation of a patented invention in region i at time





























is the density function for the qualitative increment of a
patentable innovation and ￿
i
z (t) is a risk premium resulting from the creative
destruction process that will possibly occurred in industry z at time t. The
region i innovation value growth rate equalizes the region i wage rate growth
rate since si and Ai are constant parameters (equation (7) is used to obtain
the growth rate of ￿rm value.). The return from holding the stock of a quality
leader must be the same that the return from an equal-sized investment in a
riskless bond r(t) plus a risk premium which corresponds to the instantaneous
probability of experiencing a total capital loss due to further innovation in the















z (t) = r(t) (10)
Solving the integrals, using the probability distribution on qualitative incre-
ments, the no-arbitrage conditions can be expressed as follows
￿
N
















8An important feature of the model is the number of di⁄erentiated products that are
respectively produced in the North and in the South. Following Segerstrom and Lundborg
(2002), we have assumed that the North-South distribution of industries is exogenously given;
there is no competition between north and South for di⁄erentiated products market share.
The limiting-price strategy adopted by a top-quality ￿rm in a given region enables to exclude
its only competitor installed in the same region (the latest innovator in this industry).
9￿
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We assume that workers can move freely and instantaneously across ￿rms and
activities inside each region. At each period, full employment of labor prevails
inside each region and wage adjusts instantaneously to equalize labor demand
and labor supply, this latter being exogenously given by the size of the pop-
ulation Li (the number of households in this region). The traditional good is
produced in both the regions since ￿ > 0 and the southern region serves a frac-
tion (1 ￿ ￿) of the northern demand for the traditional good. The production
































































DN (t)LN + DS (t)LS￿







z (t)+￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
DN (t)
￿wN (t) + (1 ￿ ￿)wS (t)
= 1
(13)


























In this section, we study di⁄erent steady-state equilibriums according to the
way PNR is set in each region. We ￿rst describe how is obtained the steady
state regional welfare functions depending on PNRs. Thus we expose the non-
cooperative, harmonized and cooperative equilibrium scenarii, enabling to de-
termine PNR levels based on welfare maximization.
102.1 Dynamical equations of the model
By de￿nition, the average quality of di⁄erentiated products at time t in the









z (t)dz. We calculate how Qi (t) evolves over time in steady-
state equilibrium. When an innovation occurs at time t in industry z, the quality
level in this industry jumps immediately from qz (t) up to szqz (t). By applying
the law of large numbers9, we can calculate the growth rates of the average













































Using the Keynes-Ramsey rule ( _ Di (t)=Di (t) = r(t) ￿ ￿) and the law of evolu-
tion of the average quality of di⁄erentiated products in each region previously
determined, we can form the dynamical system of this two-regions model. There
are four dynamical equations corresponding to four variables (DN (t), DS (t),
QN (t), QS (t)). The varaibles Qk(t) are state variables and variables Dk(t) are
control variables.
8
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The steady-state equilibrium is characterized by the constancy of wage rates
and consumers expenses in both regions (
_ D
N
DN = _ w
N
wN = 0 and
_ D
s
DS = _ w
S
wS =
0). The di⁄erence in regional di⁄erentiated goods average quality growth rates
(￿ = gN
Q ￿ gS
Q) , if exists, is constant. The steady-state equilibrium of the












. Details of DN ￿
sN;sS￿
are given in appendix. An important
feature of the model is that the di⁄erentiated products quality growth rates can
di⁄er between the both regions10.
9The law of large numbers enables to consider that the probability that an innovation
occurs in a given sector of a region is equally the innovation frequency in the continuum of
this region.
10A growth rate di⁄erential can appear because the di⁄erentiated goods continuum is ex-
ogenously divided in two parts and no competition exist for di⁄erentiated goods market share
between ￿rms of the two regions so that average quality growth rate in each region evolves
with its own rythmn.
11The northern market closeness degree to southern exports of traditional good
is an endogenous variable of our model. At the steady-state equilibrium, the
global trade exchange is balanced (BN = 0), which implies the value of the ￿-
parameter. The northern di⁄erentiated goods exports (XN
Z = ￿nDSLS) equals
northern imports of di⁄erentiated goods (￿ (1 ￿ n)DNLN) plus the northern
imports of traditional good ((1 ￿ ￿)CN), ensuring that BN
Z = ￿BN
C . IPR
Policy is thus related with trade policy since the value of the ￿-parameter that




). The North must balance its global trade exchange by exporting as
much di⁄erentiated goods than necessary to cover its traditional good purchase.
The instantaneous utility functions ui ￿
sN;sS￿
of representative households
in each region is given by :





















nlogQN (0) + (1 ￿ n)logQS (0)
￿
(17)















￿ (1 ￿ ￿)logwS (0)
+￿
￿
nlogQN (0) + (1 ￿ n)logQS (0)
￿
(18)
with ￿ = ￿ log￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)log(1 ￿ ￿). The intertemporal utility is the dis-







u (s ￿ t)
￿￿
ds,







￿2. Given that each economy
is already on its balanced growth path at time t = 0 (with Qi (0) = 1 8i) and
that gi
u = ￿ngN
Q +(1 ￿ n)gS
Q, the intertemporal utility function of the household





















The di⁄erentiated products average quality growth rates are equals for both
regions households since each household consumes all the range of products
of the continuum. The average weighted price of di⁄erentiated products are
equally established for consumers of both regions. Any di⁄erence that exists in
regional discounted welfare level comes from the di⁄erence in static utility levels.
The static utility depends both on wage levels (remember that wN (0) > wS (0)




). The region which has
the greatest capacity to innovate (thanks to a better research productivity Ai or
a larger population size Li), will consequently be able to allow more resources
to production and consumption and thus will enjoy a greater level of welfare.
2.3 Patent￿ s Novelty Requirement Setting
2.3.1 Non-cooperative equilibrium
When the PNRs are not yet harmonized between the two regions, each region
authority has at its disposal a strategic variable that it can use to promote
12an innovation and trade policy. Considering the implication of PNR policy on
innovation and trade, we are thus closer to the concern of the Strategic Trade
Policy framework developed by Brander [1981], Spencer and Brander [1983],
Brander and Spencer [1985], Eaton and Grossman [1986] or Cheng [1988]11. In
the present model the strategic variables are no longer taxes or subsidies but
PNRs set by Patent O¢ ces in each region. Whe have seen in the precedent
sub-section that the equilibrium solution of the model depends on the level of
PNR set by each regional authority. In this sub-section, we examine the way the
model is solved by PNRs determination on the basis of Welfare-maximization
by authorities of both regions or by a supra-regional organization.
Each region strategically chooses its IPR protection policy (its PNR level)
in order to maximize its welfare. To characterize the Nash equilibrium, we ￿rst
have to determine the northern and southern reaction functions. Let sN =
RN ￿
sS￿
and sS = RS ￿
sN￿
be the reaction functions for the North and the
South. They are given by the following maximization programs:
dUN ￿
sN;sS￿





dsS = 0 ) sS = RS ￿
sN￿
(21)
The Nash equilibrium values of the two Patent￿ s Novelty Requirement is thus
determinate as follows : sN￿ = RN ￿
RS ￿
sN￿￿￿




Unfortunately, we are not able to analytically determinate the PNRs sN￿ and
sS￿. We will thus proceed to numerical simulations of the model in order to give
numerical solutions.
Before giving some intuitions about the slope of the reaction functions, we
have to ensure that the second order conditions for maximization hold and that
an unique intersection point is welfare maximizing. Figure (1) describes the two
parabolic functions that appear in a (sN;sS) space, in the case of the benchmark
simulation (see the next section for more details on the parameter values of the
benchmark simulation).
NRF is the Northern Reaction Function (RN ￿
sS￿
) and SRF is the Southern
Recation Function (RS ￿
sN￿





dsS = 0. The second order conditions for maximization enable us to select
the right equilibrium among the four since there are four equilibria satisfying
dU
N
dsN = 0 and dU
S
dsS = 0: (1:1074;1:04205), (1:10978;1:35035), (1:7221;1:3912) and




d(sn)2 < 0 and d
2U
S
d(sS)2 < 0). For all the three other equilibria, there
is at less one second order condition that does not hold.
The ￿gure (2) plots the reaction functions (NRF and SRF) in the neighbour-
hoods of the equilibrium previously clari￿ed in order to appreciate the slope of
these curves:
The Northern and Southern reaction functions are both upward-sloping in
the (sN;sS) space, with a positive sN intercept for RN and a positive sS inter-
11We are much more closed to authors who consider reciprocal market model rather than
other ones who use a three countries model where two countries compete for market share in
a third one.
13Figure 1: Reaction functions - second order conditions
Figure 2: Reaction functions slopes - benchmark simulation
cept for RS. Even if the other region has no patentability requirement at all, it
appears optimal for a region to set its PNR strictly superior to the unity. The
upward-slopes of the two reaction functions implies that the PNRs are strate-
gic complements. A more stringent IPR regime in one region incites the other
region to increase its own PNR level (and inversely a weaker PNR in the other
region enables to lower its own PNR). Given that there is no competition for
market share in the di⁄erentiated products market, the mechanism comes from
the trade ￿ ows equilibrium. For example, if the Northern PNR is reinforced,
then the R&D process becomes more di¢ cult in the northern region but results
14in innovation of greater size and the average price of northern di⁄erentiated
products is increased, based on the limiting-price strategy. It implies that the
demand for northern di⁄erentiated products decreases in both regions and thus
northern labor force has to be redeployed towards the traditional production
sector and the R&D sector unless the southern region also increases its PNR.
If the northern di⁄erentiated goods exports decrease, imports of southern tra-
ditonal goods must also decrease in order to balance the trade ￿ ows between
the two regions. The South is forced to set a more stringent PNR to cover its
purchase of northern di⁄erentiated goods whose prices have been elevated. This
adjustement will last until the trade ￿ ows between the two regions enable to
equilibrate the global balance exchange in each region.
We can also notice that the elasticity of sS to sN is greater than the one of
sN to sS. This comes from the lower capacity in R&D of southern ￿rms which
forces the southern authority to elevate the average innovation size rather than
the innovation frequency to obtain a given level of di⁄erentiated products quality
growth rate. As the productivity of southern labor is lower than the northern
one in R&D sector, it is thus optimal for the southern region to increase its PNR
more substancially than the northern region done, compared with their initial
level to obtain the ￿ ow of innovation necessary to balance the trade ￿ ows.
As already mentioned, our objective is relatively similar to the one of Lai
and Qiu [2003] who examine the e⁄ect of IPR harmonization in the South on the
base of the standard existing in the North. But these authors use another char-
acteristic of patent as a strategic variable: its statutory life or patent length.
An important di⁄erence with the study of Lai and Qiu [2003] is that North-




means that PNR are strategic complements whereas patent lengths are strategic
substitutes in Lai and Qiu [2003].
2.3.2 Northern-inspired Harmonization
We want to study the e⁄ect that could occur from a World agreement conducing
to a PNR harmonization. We compare the non-cooperative equilibrium previ-
ously de￿ned with an equilibrium in which an harmonized level of the PNR is
imposed by a supra-regional organization. The ￿rst possible way to realize PNR
harmonization we explore is PNR harmonization on the basis of the northern
optimized PNR12 . This northern-inspired harmonization equilibrium is given






dsN = 0 under the constraint
that sS = sN.
2.3.3 Global-Welfare Maximizing Harmonization
The third scenario is the "Global-Welfare maximizing" one, that is an harmo-
nization by the supra-regional organization on the basis of a Global-Welfare
maximization. The supra-regional organization determinates the level of the
12It is not possible to realize the harmonization on the basis of the standard that previously
prevails in the North (that is the level of the Nash equilibrium value of the northern PNR
previously determined) because it implies a fall in both regional welfare and such an agreement
would not be rati￿ed.











dsW = 0 ) sW￿
We can make two remarks on this second way to realize PNR harmonization:
(i) the region with the largest population has a more important weight in the
harmonized PNR setting process13, (ii) there is a priori no reason for the value
of the harmonized PNR to be equal to the northern one. Thus this way to
realize the harmonization departs from the general point of view that IPR har-
monization is realized on the basis of the standard prevailing in the North.
By maximizing the weighted sum of welfare levels, we are not sure that
welfare levels of both regions will be superior to their Nash equilibrium welfare
levels, so that some compensatory transfer, from the region who bene￿ts from
the harmonization to the other one who su⁄ers a welfare decrease, could have
to be set up in order to make this harmonization acceptable for both regions14.
2.3.4 Cooperative equilibrium
We can also calculate the PNR levels that result from a cooperative equilibrium.
In this equilibrium, the Global-Welfare is maximized enabling heterogenous re-








dsS = 0). This is of course not
an harmonization equilibrium since regional PNRs still di⁄er, but it constitutes
a benchmark for our welfare analysis since this is an equilibrium whose results
are rather closer to the ones of the Global-welfare maximizing harmonization.
3 Numerical simulations
The system of non-linear equations is not analytically tractable and thus we
will use computer simulations to shed light on the above-mentioned four sce-
narii results. We only focus on the steady state and compare the four scenarii
equilibrium without integrating any transitional e⁄ects from one initial situation
to a ￿nal one (this is just comparative static exercize)15.
In our computer simulations, we use as benchmark parameter values AN =
0:625, AS = 0:25, LN = 1, LS = 4, ￿ = 0:5, ￿ = 0:25, ￿ = 0:05, wN(0) = 3,
wS(0) = 1, n = 0:75. The economic interpretation of these parameter choices
13Since we have made the assumption that Southern region has a more important pop-
ulation, this will not be surprizing that the South bene￿ts more than the North from this
harmonization. This feature is rather counterfactual since, for example, during WTO ne-
gociation, the country￿ s population size does not really enter into consideration. Perhaps, it
would be more realistic to consider that more developped countries (the North) have an higher
power in IPR negociation (see the Uruguay round negociation which has led to the TRIPs
agreement). However, the results obtained when we run simulation with W0 = UN + US
rather than W = LNUN + LSUS are not really di⁄erent.
14Even if a South to North compensatory transfer seems di¢ cult to be set up in the reality.
15We thus consider that the supra-regional authority realizing the PNR harmonization uses
as a welfare objective the representative households intertemporal utilities along the steady
state and does not take into account the adjustment towards this steady state.
16is as follows. ￿ = 0:5 means that half of the households expenditures relates to
traditional products whereas the other half relates to di⁄erentiated products.
Concerning di⁄erentiated products, n = 0:75 means that the North owns 75%
of the di⁄erentiated goods market share. The level of the ￿-parameter chosen
for the Pareto distribution signi￿cates that with an unitary PNR, the average
size of innovation is 1.33, that is an average quality increment of 33% based
on the precedent level of quality. The parameter ￿ = 0:05 implies that the
steady state market interest rate is 5%. The population is four times larger
in the South whereas the Northern research productivity is more than twice
stronger than the Southern one. As a consequence, the initial wage rate is three
times higher in the North than in the South. It is rather di¢ cult to provide
empirical evidence to justi￿y the choice of the above benchmark parameters
since it depends of the boundaries of what we call North and South. We want
our reference simulation to describe a situation in which the two regions are quite
di⁄erent in terms of regional parameters (research productivity Ai, initial wage
level wi (0) and size of the population Li). The parameters have been chosen to
ensure that the Northern PNR is greater than the Southern one, which appears
more realistic16. Some robustness check has been carried out (with high and low
values for each parameters) and are presented in the Appendix. Evolutions in
the value of parameters Ai, Li, ￿, ￿, ￿ and wi(0) do not change the superiority
of the non-cooperative Northern PNR on the Southern one, this feature being
rather strong for "plausible" value of key parameters. Only strong change in the
share of the continuum produced in the North (a shift from n = 0:75 to n = 0:59
is necessary) can reverse the order between the two PNR since it in￿ uences the
balance of the global trade exchange, and requires a quite di⁄erent ressources
allocation between taditional and di⁄erentiated goods production and research.
3.1 Simulation results
The choice of the optimal PNR by a regional authority has important conse-
quences on resources allocation inside each economy since the PNR levels in-
￿ uences the incentive to do research, and also the arbitrage between allocation
of labor to di⁄erentiated goods and to traditional good production (even if this
arbitrage is principally in￿ uenced the level of the n-parameter). The optimal
PNR level in a region i set by the authority on the basis of welfare maximization
depends on values taken by the key parameters describing its characteristics (re-
search capacity, size of the population, wage rate level) relatively to values taken
by the same characteristics in the other region. The optimal PNR level is also
determined by the value of variables describing the household preferences (￿, ￿)
and by the value of the parameter that calibrates the di¢ culty of the research
process (￿). The PNRs equilibrium levels depend negatively on ￿ and positively
on ￿. The PNRs equilibrium levels increase with ￿. The level of the PNR is at
last in￿ uenced by the di⁄erentiated products trade ￿ ows equilibrium since the
steady state equilibrium of the model requires a balanced global trade exchange.
Northern PNR increases with n whereas southern PNR decreases with n. The
16Ginarte and Park [1997], Park and Wagh [2002] or Maskus [2000] give strong evidence
that patent rights are better enforced in the North and that the patent scope (breadth and
height) is more important, so it seems to us that the northern PNR must be greater at the
non-cooperative equilibrium than the southern one.
17PNR level will thus determine the closeness degree of Northern market to south-
ern traditional good exports (￿) since this last endogenous variable enables to
solve for a global balance exchange equals to zero.
When a region exhibits an high capacity in research and development (Ai)
or a large population17, the level of the PNR set by the authority is relatively
greater than in the other region since the frequency of innovation is basically
high so that a more stringent PNR, even if it makes R&D more di¢ cult (the
innovation frequency lowers), forces the average innovation size to be relatively
larger. The di⁄erentiated goods average quality growth rate increases with the
PNR as long as the dynamical e¢ ciency e⁄ect of patent holds; the increased size
of innovation e⁄ect more than compensate the increased R&D di¢ culty e⁄ect
(this is the case in the simulation)18.
Results of our reference simulation are presented in tables (1). In this ref-
erence simulation, the Northern PNR is stronger than the Southern one in the
non-cooperative equilibrium (see table (1) and robustness check presented in
the Appendix). As a ￿rst remark we can notice that the non-cooperative equi-
librium is quite similar to the Northern-inspired harmonization equilibrium and
that the global-welfare-maximizing harmonization equilibrium is much closer to
the cooperative equilibrium, in terms of PNRs levels, regional growth rates, in-
stantaneous utilities, closeness degree of northern traditional good market and
global welfare. So, when the supra-regional authority has to decide how to re-
alize the PNR harmonization, its decision seems connected to a choice between
a near non-cooperative solution or a near cooperative solution.
All the simulations run lead to the same ranking of the four equilibria in
terms of Global and Southern levels of welfare. The best scenario for the
Global-welfare is of course the cooperative equilibrium, then the Global-welfare-
maximizing harmonization, then the Northern-inspired harmonization and at
last the Nash equilibrium (see Table 1 and 2). The cooperative equilibrium
scenario which is the best solution in terms of Global-welfare would be a rather
unstable situation since the Northern region has incentive to increase its PNR
until it attains its non-cooperative level, ameliorating its welfare level and re-
inforcing its instantaneous utility level. There is no incitation to cooperate for
the North.
If we consider that the initial situation is given by the non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium, in which the Northern PNR is high together with the closeness
degree of the northern traditional market, the supra-regional organization has
the choice between the northern-inspired harmonization and the global-welfare
maximizing harmonization. This latter harmonization has a bigger e⁄ect on
global-welfare and enables a greater opening-up of nothern traditional good
market to southern products. But this is oddly a northern-inspired harmoniza-
tion which seems to have been realized with the TRIPs agreement who impose
the Northern standard to the South (even if the TRIPs agreement does not
really deal with the PNR, see the discussion).
To increase signi￿cantly the global-welfare with a PNR harmonization, the
supra-regional authority has to realize the harmonization on the more cooper-
17We can notice than the assumption that AN > AS plays for a lower PNR in the North
whereas LS > LN plays for a stronger PNR in the North. In the simulation, this last e⁄ect
get the upper hand over the research productivity e⁄ect.
18Horowitz and Lai [1996] have highlighted the arbitrage existing between innovation size
and frequency and its consequences on quality growth rate.
18ative way, that is by maximizing the Global-welfare. The global-welfare maxi-
mizing harmonization increases drastically the southern welfare whereas it only
slightly decreases the northern one. Moreover, it implies a rather important
opening of the northern traditional goods market. Because the global-welfare-
maximizing harmonisation equilibrium allows to obtain better results in terms
of welfare, we focus our comments on this harmonization and its e⁄ects when
one starts from the initial non-cooperative equilibrium, giving the intuitions and
mechanisms behind the results19.
Between the non-cooperative equilibrium, the harmonization equilibria and
the cooperative equilibrium, we notice that the arbitrage between dynamic ef-
￿cacy and static ine¢ ciency e⁄ects of PNR evolves and leads to di⁄erences in
terms of welfare (see tables 2). The dynamic e¢ cacy of patent can be appreci-
ated by the world average quality growth rate of di⁄erentiated products (gQ =
ngN
Q + (1 ￿ n)gS
Q) whereas the static ine¢ ciency of patent must be appreciated












(nlog wN+(1￿n)log wS) ) or
by the level of the instantaneous utility in each region (uN and uS).
The global-welfare-maximizing PNR harmonization leads to a weaker level
of the PNR than the northern level of the non-cooperative equilibrium. The
global-welfare maximizing harmonization process therefore produces the follow-
ing e⁄ects: (i) a decrease of the average mark-up for di⁄erentiated products at
the world level that follows the PNR decrease in the northern region (the sta-
tic ine¢ ciency e⁄ect of patent weakens and thus welfare levels increase in both
regions), (ii) a decrease of the common quality growth rate since the higher
frequency coming from the lower PNR does not compensate the decrease in the
average size of innovation (the dynamic e¢ cacy e⁄ect of patent is lowered). The
￿rst e⁄ect is of greater importance in the simulation we run. Since the patent
characteristic that we use in this model play a important role in determining the
average mark-up in the economy (and not only the duration of the monopoly
as it is the case when the light is put on the length characteristic) a stronger
IPRlevel does not inevitably generate a higher level of welfare as long as the
patent ine¢ ciency e⁄ect is of a greater importance than its dynamic bene￿t. The
weaker PNR set consequently to the global-welfare maximizing harmonization
implies that there is more innovation (the frequency of innovation is higher) but
with weaker average inventive step. The weaker PNR enables a weaker average
mark-up at the world level and thus a greater level of the global-welfare.
In an open economy, the trade-o⁄ between the marginal dynamic bene￿t
and the static e¢ ciency loss due to patent policy is not as clear as in a country
closed to international trade (see KolØda [2004] for a analysis of this trade-o⁄
in a closed-economy quality ladder growth model in which the PNR is taken
into account). International trade of di⁄erentiated products spreads the ben-
e￿ts of innovation beyond national (regional) boundaries and thus, a country
(region) can not monopolize all the bene￿ts coming from protecting IPR within
its borders20. As argued by Grossman and Lai [2004]: ￿It is not obvious how
19The results we obtained when we run the simulation with W0 = UN + US rather than
W = LNUN +LSUS are the following: sW = 1:065, ￿ = 0:12853, gN
Q = 0:0255, gS
Q = 0:0111,
UN = 23:844, US = 2:117 and W = 6:4621.
20Even in our model with no knowldege externalities and no possibility to patent abroad,












Northern PNR, sN 1.1074 1.0861 1.0542 1.0582










0.03846 0.04286 0.03945 0.03554
Northern di⁄erentiated goods
production labor share, lN
X
0.66189 0.67397 0.69097 0.68792
Southern di⁄erentiated goods
production labor share, lS
X
0.17585 0.16849 0.17274 0.17843
Northern traditional good
production labor share, lN
C
0.17403 0.16848 0.16359 0.16526
Southern traditional good
production labor share, lS
C
0.78569 0.78864 0.78781 0.78603
Closeness degree of northern
trad. goods market ￿
0.1352 0.1308 0.127 0.1288
Northern expenditures, DN 3.2707 3.2505 3.2223 3.2257
Southern expenditures, DS 1.0147 1.0174 1.0154 1.0135
Northern di⁄. goods
quality growth rate, gN
Q
0.02657 0.02620 0.02506 0.02519
Southern di⁄. goods
quality growth rate, gS
Q
0.01073 0.01141 0.01087 0.01009
Northern utility, uN 2.637 2.633 2.654 2.6618
Southern utility, uS 0.8812 0.8854 0.897 0.8977
Discounted welfare of a
northern household, UN 23.916 23.86 23.823 23.863
Discounted welfare of a








6.378 6.425 6.467 6.472
Table 1: Numerical simulations results
a government ought to set its national IPR policy if some of the bene￿ts of
its national innovation accrue to foreigners, if its constituents bene￿t from in-
novation that are encouraged and take place beyond its boundaries, and if do-
mestic and foreign ￿rms di⁄er in their ability to innovate￿ . Starting from the
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, the global-welfare maximizing harmoniza-
the both regions￿consumers will enjoy a better quality-price ratio for di⁄erentiated products
if the marginal dynamic bene￿t (the quality growth) exceeds the static e¢ ciency loss (the













1.1074 / 1.042 1.4545 2.2625% 0.1352
Northern-inpired
Harmonization
1.0861 1.4494 2.2905% 0.1308
Global-welfare max.
Harmonization
1.0542 1.4132 2.155% 0.127
Cooperative
equilibrium
1.0582 / 1.02 1.4066 2.165% 0.1288
Table 2: Average mark-up, growth rate and openess degree (reference)
tion process produces some positive and negative e⁄ects at global and regional
levels:
1. A decrease in the di⁄erentiated products average mark-up for the Northern
producers (the harmonized PNR level is lower than the Nash equilibrium
level) and thus a weaker incentive to invest in R&D for northern ￿rms,
2. An increase in the di⁄erentiated products average mark-up for the South-
ern producers (the harmonized PNR level is greater than the Nash equi-
librium level) and thus a greater incentive to invest in R&D for southern
￿rms,
3. Over the World, the average mark-up on all the range of the continuum
is lowered by the PNR harmonization (the ine¢ ciency e⁄ect of patent
protection weakens and thus consumer surplus increases)21,
4. A decrease of the northern di⁄erentiated goods quality growth rate since
the higher innovation frequency implied by the lower PNR does not com-
pensate the decrease in the average size of innovation. This e⁄ect does
not occur in the southern region since the harmonized PNR is above its
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium level. Thus the growth rate of southern
di⁄erentiated goods products slightly increases.
5. At the world level, the di⁄erentiated goods average quality growth rate
decreases and thus the welfare levels decrease in both regions.
6. As the PNR increases in the South, this becomes more di¢ cult to inno-
vate. The Southern ￿rms have to allow more resources to research and
development and must decrease production and exports of di⁄erentiated
products (the southern welfare decreases and the southern ￿rms have a
weaker incentive to innovate).
21Since the southern households have initially a weaker revenue, the lower prices of di⁄er-
entiated products plays a more important e⁄ect on southern welfare.
217. The northern traditional good market liberalization (the closeness degree
of northern market to southern traditional good decreases) lowers the
average price of the traditional good for northern consumers and enables
the North to shift resources from traditional good to di⁄erentiated goods
production (the northern welfare increases).
Because of e⁄ect described in item (1.), the share of northern workers devoted





LN , decreases. Because the e⁄ect described in
item (2.) is of greater scale than the e⁄ect described item (6.), the share of
southern labor devoted to R&D slightly increases. Because the share of the
di⁄erentiated goods continuum produced in the North is quite important (n =
0:75), the weaker incentive to innovate in the North and the lower Northern
PNR conduce to a weaker average quality growth rate of di⁄erentiated goods at
the world level (item (5.) e⁄ect) even if the southern average quality growth rate
slightly increases (e⁄ect described in (4.)). The northern PNR decrease implies
a fall in average di⁄erentiated goods price and thus an increase of demand for
northern di⁄erentiated products. The share of labor devoted to di⁄erentiated
goods production increases in the North.
All in All, the Global-welfare increase comes from the fall in the average
di⁄erentiated good price (e⁄ect (3.)) and because barriers to southern tradi-
tional product are lowered in the North (e⁄ect described in item (7.)), enabling
more important trade ￿ ows (see table (3) and next sub-section) and lowering
the deadweight losses.
One of the most surprising result of this model simulation is that the PNR
harmonization is made on the basis of a weaker PNR than the Northern Nash
equilibrium level (and more precisely, on the basis of a PNR level closer to
the non-cooperative southern PNR level). Given that the PNRs are strategic
complements and that the criterium adopted by the supra-regional authority
is welfare, this result can be easily explained. By lowering the PNR level, the
supra-regional authority enables to lower the average mark-up on innovative
products at the word level (the static ine¢ ciency e⁄ect of patent decreases). The
average size of innovation decreases and the frequency of innovation increases.
The outcome in terms of average quality growth rate is rather weak (all in all
the dynamic e¢ cacy e⁄ect of patent only slightly decreases). For the parameter
values adopted for this simulation, the former static welfare e⁄ect overrides the
latter dynamic welfare e⁄ect and the harmonized PNR is less stringent than the
initial northern one.
3.1.1 Endogenous northern trade policy
Concerning the trade policy adopted by the northern region, that is the determi-
nation of the closeness degree ￿ of northern market to the southern traditional
product22, we ￿nd that a trade liberalization comes together with the PNR
harmonization. More precisely, the Northern-inspired harmonization slightly
decreases the closeness degree of Northern market to southern traditional prod-
uct, but a Global-Welfare-maximizing harmonization enables a more signi￿ca-
22Remember that the case ￿ = 0 indicates a complete trade liberalization, whereas the
case ￿ = 1 would describe the strongest protectionnist policy of the northern traditional good
market which would be completely closed to southern traditional product.
22tive decrease of the quotas imposed by the North. Qiu and Lai [2005] advance an
opposite result, using a North-South trade model with innovation and imitation:
￿The globally optimal Northern tari⁄ increases as IPR protection in the North
and the South decreases. Global welfare may rise as Northern tari⁄ increases
(...)￿ . But as already mentioned, the patent characteristic used by Qiu and Lai
is the patent length so that North and South authorities have strategic substi-
tutes at their disposal and not strategic complements as in the present model.
Moreover, the patent length characteristic has no e⁄ect on price, contrary to
the PNR.
The ￿gure (3) plots the northern closeness degree of traditional good market




Figure 3: Closeness degree of northern traditional goods market
Remember that the North balance its global trade exchange by exporting as
much di⁄erentiated goods than necessary to cover its traditonal good imports.
When the PNR harmonization enables the North to increase its exports of
di⁄erentiated products (especially when it lowers the PNR), the North will
lower its quota on traditional goods.
The table (3) shows the exports ￿ ows and prices associated to the four






C always holds. We can notice that the global-welfare maximizing
enables an increase of northern di⁄erentiated goods and southern traditional
good exports.
The level of the closeness degree that enables to balance the the global trade
exchange is ￿ = ￿









and, as we can
constate on ￿gure (3), this function is upward-sloping in the northern PNR and
downward-sloping in the southern PNR. Moreover the closeness degree has a
greater positive elasticity to northern PNR than its negative one to southern
PNR. This is the reason why the northern-inspired harmonization has more


























0.3436 0.2943 4.4296 1.3894 1.1132
Northern-inpired
Harmonization
0.3513 0.2806 4.3444 1.4481 1.1198
Global-welfare max.
Harmonization
0.3612 0.2866 4.2168 1.4056 1.1203
Cooperative
equilibrium
0.3592 0.2965 4.2328 1.3600 1.1170
Table 3: Trade ￿ ows and prices (reference simulation)
this latter enabling both an increase in the southern PNR and a decrease in the
northern one.
3.2 Discussion and possible extensions of the model
While moving away from the non-cooperative equilibrium, the North has very to
lose whereas the South can only bene￿t from a global-welfare-maximizing har-
monization. This result appears rather counter-factual because the developped
countries (especially the United-States) had put the IPR harmonization on the
table during the Uruguay round negociation and we thus have some di¢ culty
to explain their motivation. But one can argue than the TRIPs agreement does
not say anything about the PNR. This model is much more a prediction on
what could occur in case of future negociation on IPR, including a part on the
PNR, rather than an explaination of what had happened following the TRIPs
agreement.
An important caveat to the results of the model is the lack of knowledge
externalities between the two regions and the impossibility to compete for dif-
ferentiated goods market share23. These restrictions of the model limits its
ability to fully characterize the welfare outcome an IPR agreement. In our
model, the emphasis is put on the familiar trade-o⁄ between the incentive to
innovate given by a greater PNR level (and so on the higher growth rate) and
the consumer surplus loss due to the mark-up level implied by this PNR level.
But other aspects of Intellectual Property Rights are not taken into account:
neither the struggle against imitation is examined since we do not consider the
existence of imitation, nor the possibility to earn royalties based on licensing
agreements (see Yang and Maskus [2001] for a discussion of this aspect). Taking
into account the possibility of FDI could also improve the conclusion of this
23A ￿rst version of this article was presented with an endogenous di⁄erentiated market
share but the model is then much less tractable without this feature globally changes the
results and conclusion. We have thus adopt for the present version of the model the Lundborg
and Segerstrom [2002] exogenous industry con￿guration proposed by a referee. I thank this
anonymous referee for this proposal.
24model, introducing another link between the two regions (see Glass and Saggi
[2005] for a study of this aspect).
Perhaps the most important caveat comes from the fact that we have adopted
an endogenous growth framework with scale e⁄ects (innovation increases with
the size of the population which is unrealistic as emphasized by Jones [1995]).
We have adopted this framework by convenience in order to make appear the
dynamic e¢ cacy e⁄ect of patent in the easiest way. A semi-endogenous growth
framework would have easily withdraw the scale e⁄ects problem but the dynamic
e⁄ect of patent would have disappeared along the steady state so we would have
been forced to study the transitional dynamics to catch the dynamic e⁄ect of a
shift in the PNR setting. We do not ignore than some scale-free North-South
growth model exists (see Dinopoulos and Segerstrom [2006] for example) or that
introducing a R&D di¢ culty proportional to the size of the market may address
this problem (see Dinopoulos and Waldo [2005]). Future research will present a
scale-free version of this model, including an endogenous share of di⁄erentiated
goods produced in each region, based on quality-adjusted price competition
between ￿rms of both regions in the same sector.
Conclusion
Without any surprise, the results of the numerical simulations we have run,
based on plausible values for key parameters of the theoretical model presented
in this article imply that, in case of harmonization, the South has to adopt a
stronger PNR than initially set in the non-cooperative equilibrium. More sur-
prising, PNR harmonization (even the Northern-inspired harmonization) leads
to a lowering of Northern PNR compared to its non-cooperative Nash equilib-
rium.
PNR harmonization and the opening-up of the traditional market are com-
plementary. This e⁄ect is bounded by the exogenous industry con￿guration
scheme adopted but could certainly lead to an increase in the northern welfare
if the share of di⁄erentiated goods produced in the North could evolve.
In terms of welfare, the PNR harmonization increases the Southern welfare
when we consider that, in the initial non-cooperative equilibrium, the North-
ern PNR was the strongest. There is no possible increasement in Northern
welfare level following harmonization of any sort but the Northern-inspired har-
monization lowers less the Northern welfare than the Global-welfare-maximizing
harmonization.
A World agreement on PNR harmonization will thus have to be accompa-
nied by another agreement on a North-South concern which bene￿ts more to
the North, to ensure the acceptance by the Northern authority of the PNR har-
monization. In this model, we have considered that di⁄erentiated goods market
was completely open in the South, which seems unrealistic. Starting from an
initial closed situation, the opening-up of Southern di⁄erentiated goods market
to Northern goods should certainly be the compensatory measure for acceptance
by the North of the PNR harmonization
25References
Aghion Ph., Howitt P. [1992], ￿A Model of Growth through Creative De-
struction￿ , Econometrica, 60(2), pp.323-351.
Aghion Ph., Howitt P. [2005], ￿Growth with Quality-Improving Innova-
tions: An integrated Framework￿ , in Aghion P., Durlauf S. (eds) Handbook of
Economic Growth, Elsevier.
Brander J. [1981], ￿Intra-Industry trade in identical products￿ , Journal of
International Economics, 11, pp.1-14.
Brander J., Spencer B. [1985], ￿Export subsidies and market share rivalry￿ ,
Journal of International Economics, 18, pp.83-100.
Cheng L. [1988], ￿Assisting domestic industries under international oligopoly￿ ,
American Economic Review, 78, pp.291-314.
Dinopoulos E. and Segerstrom P. [2006], ￿North-South Trade and Eco-
nomic Growth￿ , mimeo.
Dinopoulos E. and Suener F. [2004], ￿New Directions in Schumpeterian
Growth Theory￿ , in H. Hanusch and A. Pyka (eds) Edgar Companion to Neo-
Schumpeterian Ecomonics, Edward Elgar.
Dinopoulos E., Waldo D. [2005], ￿Gradual Product Replacement, Intangible-
Asset Prices and Schumpeterian Growth￿ , Journal of Economic Growth, 10(2),
pp.135-157.
Dinopoulos E., Gungoraydinoglu A., Syropoulos C. [2005], ￿Patent
Protection and Global Schumpeterian Growth￿ , mimeo.
Eaton J. and Grossman G. [1986], ￿Optimal trade and industrial policy
under oligopoly￿ , Quaterly Journal of Economics, 101, pp.383-406.
Gallini N. [1992], ￿Patent Policy and Costly Imitation￿ , RAND Journal of
Economics, 23, pp.52-63.
Ginarte J. and Park W. [1997], ￿Determinants of patent rights: A cross-
national study￿ , Research Policy, 26, pp.283-301.
Glass A., Saggi K. [2002], ￿Intellectual property rights and foreign direct
investment￿ , Journal of International Economics, 56, pp.387-410.
Grossman G. and Helpman E. [1991], Innovation and Growth in the Global
Economy, MIT Press.
Grossman G. and Lai E.[2004], ￿International Protection of Intellectual
Property￿ , American Economic Review, 94(5), pp.1635-653.
Helpman E. [1993], ￿Innovation, Imitation and Intellectual Property Rights￿ ,
Econometrica, 61(6), pp.1247-1280.
Helpman E., Melitz M., Yeaple S. [2004], ￿Exports Versus FDI with
Heterogenous Firms￿ , American Economic Review, 94(1), pp.300-316.
Horowitz A. and Lai E. [1996], ￿Patent lenght and the rate of innovation￿ ,
International Economic Review, 37, pp.785-801.
Hunt R. [1999], ￿Nonobviousness and the Incentive to Innovate: A Economic
Analysis of the Intellectual Property Reform￿ , Federal Reserve Bank of Philade-
phia working paper #99-3.
Jones C. [1995], ￿R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth￿ , Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 103, pp.759-784.
Klemperer P. [1990], ￿How broad should the scope of patent be ?￿ , RAND
Journal of Economics, 21, pp.113-130.
KolØda G. [2004], ￿Patent￿ s Novelty Requirement and Endogenous Growth￿ ,
Revue d￿ Øconomie politique, 114(2), pp.201-221.
26Kortum S. [1997], ￿Research, Patenting and Technological Change￿ , Econo-
metrica, 65, pp.1389-1419.
Lundborg P., Segerstrom P. [2002], ￿The growth and wefare e⁄ects of
international mass migration￿ , Journal of International Economics, 56, pp.177-
204.
Kwan F. and Lai E. [2003], ￿Intellectual Property Rights Protection and
Endogenous Economic Growth￿ , Journal of Economics Dynamics and Control,
27, pp.853-873.
Lai E. [1998], ￿International Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Rate
of Product Innovation￿ , Journal of Development Economics, February, pp.133-
153.
Lai E. and Qiu L. [2003], ￿The North￿ s Intellectual Property Rights Standard
for the South?￿ , Journal of International Economics, 59, pp.183-209.
Maskus K. and Penubarti M. [1995], ￿How trade-related are intellectual
property rights?￿ , Journal of International Economics, 39, pp.227-248.
Maskus K. [2000], Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy, Insti-
tute For International Economics.
McCalman Ph. [2001], ￿Reaping what you sow: an empirical analysis of
international patent harmonization￿ , Journal of International Economics, 55,
pp.161-186.
Nordhaus W. [1969], Invention, Growth and Welfare, MIT Press.
Park W. and Wagh S. [2002], ￿Index of Patent Rights￿ , Economic Freedom
of the World: 2002 Annual Repor, Chapter 2.
Qiu L. and Lai E. [2005], ￿Protection of Trade for Innovation: The Roles of
Northern and Southern Tari⁄s￿ , Japan and the World Economy, forthcoming.
Segerstrom P., Anant T. and Dinopoulos E. [1990], ￿A Schumpeterian
Model of the Product Life Cycle￿ , American Economic Review, 80, pp.1077-
1091.
Spencer B. and Brander J. [1983], ￿International R&D rivalry and indus-
trial strategy￿ , Review of Economic Studies, 50, pp.707-722.
Yang G. and Maskus K. [2001], ￿Intellectual property rights, licensing, and
innovation in an endogenous product-cycle model￿ , Journal of International
Economics, 53, pp.169-187.
27Appendixes





























































































Expression of the frequency of innovation
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Determination of steady-state variables expression












































Using the results given by robustness checks, we notice that Northern and












































































R & D pro c.,
￿=0.2
Northern PNR, sN 1.1163 1.0968 1.1177 1.1004 1.1427 1.0885








0.04839 0.03203 0.04321 0.03486 0.05338 0.02955
Northern di⁄erentiated goods
production labor share, lN
X
0.72339 0.60042 0.65092 0.6711 0.60137 0.70182
Southern di⁄erentiated goods
production labor share, lS
X
0.19154 0.15961 0.17149 0.17889 0.16030 0.18495
Northern traditional good
production labor share, lN
C
0.08376 0.26366 0.16549 0.18247 0.17326 0.17497
Southern traditional good
production labor share, lS
C
0.76307 0.80836 0.7853 0.78624 0.78632 0.7855
Closeness degree of northern
trad. goods market ￿
0.0640 0.2083 0.12915 0.1408 0.1346 0.1359
Northern expenditures, DN 3.2794 3.2605 3.2247 3.3167 3.2686 3.2751
Southern expenditures, DS 1.0155 1.0141 1.0127 1.017 1.0154 1.0147
Northern di⁄. goods
quality growth rate, gN
Q
0.03087 0.02231 0.02933 0.02393 0.05087 0.01552
Southern di⁄. goods
quality growth rate, gS
Q
0.01252 0.00902 0.01833 0.00981 0.02059 0.00642
Northern utility, uN 2.9161 2.3849 2.5939 2.6751 2.4478 2.7469
Southern utility, uS 0.9320 0.8413 0.8744 0.8864 0.81874 0.917
Discounted welfare of a
northern household, UN 27.187 20.801 31.628 19.233 26.563 22.859
Discounted welfare of a








8.936 4.129 9.881 4.5049 9.040 5.305



















Northern PNR, sN 1.0823 1.1242 1.1112 1.12852








0.04555 0.03686 0.07122 0.03059
Northern di⁄erentiated goods
production labor share, lN
X
0.58348 0.74247 0.46572 0.77924
Southern di⁄erentiated goods
production labor share, lS
X
0.19489 0.15995 0.23331 0.16216
Northern traditional good
production labor share, lN
C
0.29295 0.05248 0.39886 0.03052
Southern traditional good
production labor share, lS
C
0.75956 0.8032 0.69547 0.80725
Closeness degree of northern
trad. goods market ￿
0.2823 0.0341 0.5174 0.0187
Northern expenditures, DN 3.247 3.2875 3.1372 3.3898
Southern expenditures, DS 1.0227 1.0119 1.0189 1.0133
Northern di⁄. goods
quality growth rate, gN
Q
0.02064 0.03248 0.04365 0.02246
Southern di⁄. goods
quality growth rate, gS
Q
0.00916 0.01283 0.01842 0.00871
Northern utility, uN 2.425 2.786 2.032 2.902
Southern utility, uS 0.8918 0.874 0.8768 0.876
Discounted welfare of a
northern household, UN 21.628 26.002 21.647 25.113
Discounted welfare of a








6.2647 6.676 10.442 4.9475
















go o ds pro d.
fraction,
n = 0:8
Northern PNR, sN 1.0039 1.0441 1.0946 1.1128








0.09969 0.08753 0.05567 0.02725
Northern di⁄erentiated goods
production labor share, lN
X
0.42028 0.46539 0.59369 0.70313
Southern di⁄erentiated goods
production labor share, lS
X
0.37195 0.33149 0.22767 0.14592
Northern traditional good
production labor share, lN
C
0.50794 0.44014 0.26417 0.1201
Southern traditional good
production labor share, lS
C
0.52836 0.58098 0.71665 0.82684
Closeness degree of northern
trad. goods market ￿
0.9457 0.6369 0.2432 0.0854
Northern expenditures, DN 3.106 3.1426 3.2295 3.2943
Southern expenditures, DS 1.0421 1.0365 1.0222 1.0102
Northern di⁄. goods
quality growth rate, gN
Q
0.01288 0.01644 0.02339 0.02843
Southern di⁄. goods
quality growth rate, gS
Q
0.02591 0.02292 0.01503 0.00782
Northern utility, uN 1.9352 2.226 2.5735 2.6562
Southern utility, uS 1.0915 1.0419 0.9309 0.8356
Discounted welfare of a
northern household, UN 17.252 19.942 23.026 24.399
Discounted welfare of a








8.090 7.793 6.757 6.237
















northern R & D
pro ductivity,
AN = 0:75
Northern PNR, sN 1.1073 1.1077 1.0996 1.11564








0.03463 0.04236 0.03851 0.03878
Northern di⁄erentiated goods
production labor share, lN
X
0.6632 0.66107 0.67183 0.65366
Southern di⁄erentiated goods
production labor share, lS
X
0.17661 0.17359 0.17778 0.17407
Northern traditional good
production labor share, lN
C
0.17225 0.17501 0.18624 0.16589
Southern traditional good
production labor share, lS
C
0.78876 0.78406 0.78371 0.78715
Closeness degree of northern
trad. goods market ￿
0.1334 0.1362 0.14415 0.12916
Northern expenditures, DN 3.2706 3.271 3.3289 3.2324
Southern expenditures, DS 1.0182 1.0129 1.0146 1.015
Northern di⁄. goods
quality growth rate, gN
Q
0.02665 0.02654 0.01857 0.03469
Southern di⁄. goods
quality growth rate, gS
Q
0.00774 0.01401 0.01077 0.01076
Northern utility, uN 2.640 2.632 2.679 2.606
Southern utility, uS 0.8846 0.8782 0.8837 0.8785
Discounted welfare of a
northern household, UN 23.804 24.034 23.033 24.897
Discounted welfare of a








6.306 6.4736 5.2894 7.4999
Table 7: Robustness checks
32Endogenous
variables
















Northern PNR, sN 1.0982 1.1405 1.1360 1.1112








0.052585 0.03238 0.03566 0.04704
Northern di⁄erentiated goods
production labor share, lN
X
0.57504 0.76405 0.71947 0.60851
Southern di⁄erentiated goods
production labor share, lS
X
0.19277 0.15736 0.16187 0.18238
Northern traditional good
production labor share, lN
C
0.29788 0.01266 0.07827 0.24627
Southern traditional good
production labor share, lS
C
0.75464 0.81025 0.80245 0.77057
Closeness degree of northern
trad. goods market ￿
0.23256 0.0105 0.06224 0.19027
Northern expenditures, DN 3.2618 3.307 2.7498 3.82
Southern expenditures, DS 0.76333 1.3518 1.0153 1.0171
Northern di⁄. goods
quality growth rate, gN
Q
0.02082 0.03463 0.03151 0.02340
Southern di⁄. goods
quality growth rate, gS
Q
0.01389 0.00906 0.00985 0.01259
Northern utility, uN 2.878 2.365 2.458 2.763
Southern utility, uS 0.7913 0.9705 0.934 0.8289
Discounted welfare of a
northern household, UN 24.96 22.861 23.211 24.466
Discounted welfare of a








4.301 8.612 7.726 5.200
Table 8: Robustness checks
33